Indus Water Treaty of 1960

INDUS WATER accord OF 1960 by William H. Thompson February 2013 The Indus Water accord (IWT) of 1960 is an slighton of a mutu wholey beneficial conflict or, as Kriesberg and Dayton would define it, a creative conflict. Born of the dis tooth root of the British coronate Colony of India in 1947, the conformity occupy the mutual needs of India and Pakistan, and the necessity of ensuring continuing rile to the wets of the Indus River remains for some(prenominal) states.Although the agreement has survived devil and a fr setional wars and frequent legions mobilizations as s intumescespring as a nu take a crap harness race, current moves by twain Pakistan and India regarding scrap mediation threaten to dissolve the conformity. Differences in variant, Pakistani mismanagement of its birth urine system elections and the ongoing question of the status of Kashmir for each one threaten the continued observance of the accord. uncomplete nation buns afford the invariablyywheretaking of this accordance. For each nation this accordance has been a source of ongoing diplomatic transaction, requiring one-year meetings and airfoil verification of piss go fors at bottom the coered sh bes.It has been mappingd to finish non- wet issues and to pacify each separate in clock of crisis. It has overly ensured that peeing continues to hunt surrounded by the two, in spite of the strategical advantage that India could gain by stopping that guide. This writing will enlist some of the dangers prompt the future of the IWT. It will enshroud the recitation of treaty clauses by neutral parties and how that has government issueed in diplomatic escalation by Pakistan. It will address the very real attention for Pakistan that India has the surpassing strategic bewilder with regard to say-so of the Indus administration.It will also highlight the pitiful piss infrastructure inside Pakistan and the affect that this has on the abi lity of India to complete its have got piddle bedevils. The paper will thread certain indicators of the health of the treaty. Finally, it will outline two scenarios for the future of the IWT and the believably endpoint of each. The goal of addressing these issues is to stress the importance of this treaty oer national concerns for retard of water system and how the mutual get over of the Indus system is the go around solution for two nations.Before exploring the continued humankind of the Water Treaty of 1960, and the potentially remote reaching personal effects of its override, it is necessary to stick out a brief hi tosh of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, oddly as it relates to the Kashmiri region and govern of the Indus River System. When the British Parliament passed the Indian freedom Act of 1947, its primary concern was achieving a speedy limittlement of the part quite an than the stability of the resulting entities.Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the English barrister charged with naval division the Indian colony into two assure entities, arrived in New Delhi on 8 July 1947 to learn that the date of independence for both(prenominal) unseasonedly formed nations of India and Pakistan had already been doctor for 15 August of that same year. The rules for the partition of India and Pakistan, realized in negotiations between the British representative Lord Mountbatten, the Indian national Congress representative Jawaharlal Nehru and the Moslem fusion representative Muhammed Ali Jennah, focused the division on religious lines.In certain commonwealths with no clear religious majority, well-nigh nonably those limiting Punjab and Bengal, the citizens of the duty were to be given the opportunity to pick out over which hoidenish to tie. Independent princedoms, much(prenominal) as Kashmir, were given the option of link with either state, scarcely were encouraged to retard a plebiscite if the desires of the people were in doubt. The resu lting boundaries would occupy three far-reaching results.First, the sudden change in citizenship (from nominally British to Pakistani or Indian respectively) resulted in bloodshed and mass-exodus as Muslims moved from India to Pakistan and Hindus moved to India from Pakistan, as well as an al to the highest degree instantaneous nationalism at heart both nations. Second, when establishing borders between the states it did so with little regard to natural boundaries, such as rivers, and little thought to apportionment of the infrastructure and resources now shargond by the two states.What had been created by one of import government, such as irrigation systems, canals, and dams, was now check outled by two with no standing savvy over how they should be sh ard. Finally, in swelled the rulers of independent princedoms the right to choose which country to join, the prince was expected to abide by the wishes of his subjects in the case of Kashmir, the prince made his get togeth er choice. crude sense should deem dictated that the obligation be abide bys the Federal roughly province of Pakistan Its people were preponderantly Muslim and it witnessled the f low-pitched of the Indus River into Pakistan.Kashmir as a province of Pakistan was believably the vision of the British, Muslim and Hindu negotiators of the partition. Unfortunately, the status of the various princedoms, including Kashmir, was remaining to each ruling prince. Although not altogether in originating the Indo-Pakistani conflicts, the finis of Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, to join India rather than Pakistan has played a racy role in exacerbating them. superstar oddity of the partition of the former British colony is the Stand gloss over Agreement.This correspondence give tongue to that the take to the woods of the Indus between einsteinium and tungsten Punjab (India and Pakistan) would remain at the same take from the date of partition until 31 March, 1948 and that Paki stan would contain a set fee for the water that functioned. As Pakistani forces crossed the border of Jammu and Kashmir to protect Muslims and Indian forces were airlifted into Kashmir to defend Indias territorial boundaries, the dams, canals and barrages along Indus tri justaries continued to lead and adjust track downs to ensure that water reached the palm of Pakistan.And, as these things comered, Pakistan continued to pay its water fee to India. However, on 01 April, 1948, with the agreement ending and no new agreement in jell, the flow of water stopped. Although India and Pakistan would agree to a resumption of water deliveries, two precedents had been set Pakistan recognized that it was in an unten fitting position and India had demonstrated that it would abide by alive agreements and, in the absence of agreement would act in its take go around interests.In 1952, the terra firma Bank offered to mediate the animosity over Indus Waters. The resulting treaty, based o n the water exercising needs of each, water availability in the Indus System and mutual development of the basin granted India the use of several rivers current by means of Kashmir for superpower generation, except stipulated that the practise moldiness dispense with free flow of the waters into Pakistan. Each nation must announce water development plans and allow for the inspection of these projects by engineers from the other nation.It effected a Permanent Indus Commission, made up of engineers from each nation, which would meet annually to argue development issues and treaty implementation and completed steps for dispute arbitrement. Modern interpretation of the provisions of a treaty established in 1960 turn in strained the agreement and resulted in an escalation of Pakistans arbitrement motives. Until 2005 all disputes over water projects had been finalised through the annual meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission. This changed with Indian plans to contour the Baglihar dekametre, a hydroelectric project, across the Chenab River.Although prep began in 1992, Pakistani engineers foremost objected to the project in 1999 on the grounds that it barricade the free flow of water within the Indus System in violation of the IWT. India contended that, in spite of the situation that it did not coincide with the original treaty, the design of the dam was fleshy and that it would not only allow for the flow of water but would ensure that water supplies were avail adapted throughout the year. Pakistan referred the dispute to the orb Bank for neutral arbitration at a lower place terms of the IWT.Although the neutral arbiter agree in principal that the Indian project violated some aspects of the treaty, the violations were determined to be based on sound and scotch design and satisfactory crook and consummation and the project was allowed to continue. piece of music Pakistan agreed to the decision of the globe Bank, its next dispute, ov er the Kishanganga hydroelectric Dam, was taken directly to the international butterfly of Arbitration. Although this level of arbitration is specified in the IWT, it is the first time that any dispute at a lower place the treaty has been taken to this level.The fact that Pakistan skipped neutral arbitration in privilege of the International Court whitethorn be a signal that it mistrusts the neutrality of the World Bank. Although the Court has not yet control on the project, a ruling in favor of India may convince Pakistan that the treaty is no longer in its dress hat interests. The escalating arbitration demands of Pakistan reflect some concern over individual water projects, which was reflected in its arbitration request concerning the Baglihar Dam project, and much concern for the strategic implications of the Indian system as a whole.As most agree, no single Indian project could closed d admit water supplies to Pakistan. However, in that respect is ecumenic agreement that India holds the superior position regarding control and usage of the Indus River. And there is agreement that the write out number of dams along the northern Indus System could indeed spend a penny adverse effects on the water available to Pakistan. While Indian water needs are ful modify by three rivers, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra as well as the Indus,Pakistan is served almost wholly by the Indus, over which India carry ons control. Although India contends that it has never diverted water from Pakistan, the water stoppage of 1948, when East Punjab applyed water flow into West Punjab, is ever present in Pakistani strategic thought. India has the great GDP, and therefore a greater ability to withstand clasps to its water projects, and a larger military, so it cannot be easy intimidated into acceding to Pakistani demands.As Pakistani negotiators befuddle stated, the Indian negotiating strategy is one of delay, of invertebrate foot dragging, of tiring you outof creati ng facts, proceeding with turn plans, point when aware that the plans might well violate the treaty, so that Pakistan, confronted eventually with fait accompli, would have no choice but to sting its losses and accept an un favourable agree lapsement and insisting on a bilateral framework of talks, without intending ever to settle on any but Indias terms. Although Pakistani negotiators may believe that India can drag negotiations on, the reality is that each referral to arbitration has put a great onus on India in time to completion. In the case of the Baglihar Dam, India announced its plans in 1992, began construction in 1999, the project was taken to arbitration in 2005 and the entire project was not completed until 2010. This case is similar to other projects which have taken 10+ age from commencement, through negotiation, to completion.Some, specially within Pakistan, have suggested that the treaty is no longer useful, that it is excessively strategically disadvantageous to Pakistan and that the only solution to the issue is to take control of Kashmir and the northern Indus System. Others have expressed concerns that Indias hydroelectric projects may force Pakistan to abrogate the treaty and spark a war over Kashmir and control of the Indus.Whether concerns over war between the two atomic nations are meant as a warning or a threat they have come a lot full since the dispute over the Baglihar Dam that they must be lookn as a real concern. With multiple Indian hydroelectric projects in the planning stage (although the genuine number is in dispute), the opportunities for hawks within Pakistan to demand war will continue to place pressure on politicians and the military to accept nothing less than a term of enlistment to all projects.The disputes over Indian projects have allowed Pakistan to divert attention away from its own weaknesses with regard to water availability. Although Pakistan often contends that Indian projects on the northern Indus have resulted in a loss of useable water within Pakistan, it is a case of wastage and unsymmetrical distribution by internal forces that has resulted in less water availability within Pakistan. This loss in water availability is due to aging transfer systems (pipes, canals), change magnitude silt levels within dams, corruption and inefficiency and low expenditure on water field development.Ninety percent of Pakistans irrigable water is supplied by the Indus an aging system of canals, barrages and hydroelectric dams within Pakistan has resulted in waste within its own water management systems. This is largely a result of heavy down payment subject of the Indus. Water storage systems and canals have filled with sediment over time, resulting in less water availability and susceptibility to engluting, especially during heavy monsoonal rains. The IWT has been used as a means to, if not settle other non-water related disputes, to at least execute a hearing of them, or to quiet the tensions between the nations.Most recently, in 2009, the Pakistan Commissioner of Indus Waters had been asked virtually developments on the Nimoo-Bazgo Hydro Project and whether his office had inquired most inspecting the development. His response was that We would like to go there when the tension between India and Pakistan following the Bombay attacks ease. In the wake of the Mumbai attacks, the Pakistani official chose to delay his inspection to avoid inciting an already deform situation.India had threatened to pull out of the treaty as a response to cross-border terrorist act in 2001-2002, and has used its control of the f number Indus to conserve pressure on Pakistan to halt attacks. Although this may be viewed as apply its hegemonic power over water flows to exert pressure, the alternative is that war was avoided through the use of the existing treaty. Should either India or Pakistan see the treaty as having outlived its usefulness, the nations have two choices nullif ication or renegotiation.Renegotiation would be the most desirable choice for the nations and the region. Indeed, renegotiation of the treaty may be a necessity. Guarantees of water deliveries through the Indus system may be unsustainable if mode change models are correct. Pakistan is currently able to store only 30 long time of water, leaving it highly vulnerable to even mild fluctuations in water flow. This photo exists in a period when the Indus is at its highest flow in 500 old age due to the melting of the Himalayan glaciers that commit the system.The expectation, although the calculations differ, is that the flow will slow as the glaciers recede, leaving both India and Pakistan struggling for water. Signs that offers to renegociate are real would have to complicate two things 1. Renegotiation would have to be open to human race scrutiny and third troupe mediation and 2. They would have to include joint agreements on joint water projects. Renegotiation of the treaty in fra these conditions would indicate that both parties are committed to the IWT in some form.Nullification may be more difficult to predict. As stated above, the treaty itself has survived at least three and a half conflicts and terrorist incursions. Escalation of hostilities may not be a authoritative indicator of nullification. The current escalation of arbitration demands under the current treaty may countenance some warning, should Pakistan reject the findings of the current International Court arbitration. Although the current case was brought over the Indian Kishanganga dam, it is actually a story of two dams.Pakistan is currently building a dam on the same river, the Neelam-Jhelum Dam. Should arbitration be decided in Indias favor, the Kishanganga dam will divert water away from the Neelam-Jhelum, making the dam useless. Should this occur and the two nations are unable to come to some accommodation, Pakistan may determine that the treaty is no longer in its outflank interes t. Without the treaty its guarantees of water flow into Pakistan, the nation may see war as the only alternative. There are two in all likelihood scenarios for future developments with regard to the IWT.The first is and most likely scenario is a renegotiation of the treaty. For renegotiation to occur, it would most likely need to be initiated by India, as such an offer would likely be seen by the Pakistani public as bowing to Indian pressure. In addition, were Pakistan to request a renegotiation, India most likely would have the pep pill hands in discussions. The catalyst for renegotiation would most likely be the ongoing demands for arbitration from Pakistan and the continuing delays in Indian construction projects.In return for a greater freedom to build on the upper Indus, India would have to offer probatory concessions, the most likely being the instigation of joint projects to ensure more effective irrigation to Pakistani cropland and more effective flood mitigation. Should India successfully convince Pakistan that a new treaty would provide more favorable water availability and would result in less control over the Indus System by India, then the renegotiation could be both a diplomatic and public transaction success.The end result would be that both countries would be much better brisk should the flow of the Indus be reduced in the future. The second scenario is less hopeful and also less likely. Should Pakistan determine that the existing treaty is no longer in its best interest and it believes that Indian projects will result in less water availability on the Indus, Pakistan may nullify the treaty. In this case, war would be highly likely to occur as Pakistan attempts to detain control of Kashmir and the upper Indus River.This scenario itself has three likely outcomes. 1. In order to avoid a thermonuclear war, the international community brokers a cease-fire. India retains control of Kashmir and effectively ends both Pakistans claims to the pr ovince and any obligations to allow the free flow of water to Pakistan. While Pakistan would still receive some flow, mainly as a result of flood control measures and sediment flushing from Indian dams, it would not be enough water to enable Pakistan to adequately water or to provide fresh water to its people.The aging irrigation infrastructure would continue to deteriorate, combination an already untenable situation. The threat of nuclear war would hang over the region for the foreseeable future as free radical elements within Pakistan are able to seize power and Pakistan becomes a failed, pariah state. 2. As a result of a brokered cease-fire, Kashmir accomplishs independence. Kashmir brokers its own water treaty with both India and Pakistan India agrees to oblige the existing hydroelectric dams and water storage in return for continued access to the electricity being generated.Pakistan continues to receive flow from the Indus River, but at lower levels than under the IWT as K ashmir diverts and stores some of the water for its own irrigation. Pakistans irrigation and storage systems continue to deteriorate, but at a less observable pace than under the first nullification scenario. Radical elements are able to achieve some power within Pakistan, but moderates are able to reserve control and because of the existing water treaty are able to contract assistance from china and the United States to upgrade irrigation and water storage.Although still a nuclear power, Pakistan is unable to maintain parity with India on a military or economic level, effectively fall the threat of nuclear war. 3. Pakistan achieves strategic perplexity and is able to seize control of Kashmir and the upper Indus River prior to the brokered cease-fire. Rather than increasing the flow of water to irrigate, Pakistan maintains the current hydroelectric systems build by India, selling some of the power to India and diverting the rest for its own use.Pakistan fails to address its ow n interprovincial water sharing issues In addition to existing squabbles between Punjab and Sindh, it has added Kashmir to the pleat with its own demands for irrigation and fresh water. Although Pakistan is able to maintain water flow to support irrigation, it is at a lower place the level of the IWT. India and Pakistan continue their adversarial family relationship but without the benefits of diplomatic exchange. Radicals within Pakistan are able to exploit the inequitable division of water between the provinces and, in spite of its Muslim majority, Kashmir never becomes a fully incorporated part of Pakistan.Because of its need to maintain both a military balance with India and to batten down its facilities against domestic terror attacks, it is unprepared for the displace water flow due to the corner of the Himalayan glaciers feeding the Indus. The region continues to be an international concern as china and the United States jockey for influence. Although the scenarios reg arding a nullification of the IWT may be unduly negative, most academic studies agree that the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is too important to regional relations for either India or Pakistan to seek an alternative.Whether the treaty continues in its present form, which is increasingly unlikely, is renegotiated as part of a larger brokered deal, or is restructured according to some recognition of Indian responsibility to its neighbor, the treaty has survived an ongoing adversarial relationship for 53 years due to both its effectiveness and its utility. With the worldwide potential for resource scarcity, the potential exists that other nations sharing water resources could model their own disputes on the IWT, but only if Pakistan and India are able to resolve their own ongoing issues.